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Abstract
Beginning in 1953, radiation exposure and its effects
became a hotly contested issue between the government,
members of communities surrounding the Nevada Test
Site (NTS), and researchers within the national scientific
community. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
concerned about maintaining a continental testing facility
and aware that atomic testing would impact communities
surrounding the NTS, sent representatives to areas
potentially affected by fallout to instruct and reassure the
affected public. How government officials perceived
neighboring communities and how these communities
perceived these representatives of the government often
determined public responses to the atomic testing
program. The story of radiation monitors and the
communities they served is indicative of the ways in
which Americans viewed the concepts of safety and risk
during the Cold War.

“radiation had not reached a hazardous level” in any of
these areas. [1]
In the days and months that followed “Dirty Harry,”
as the test was later named [Figure 1], it became
increasingly apparent to the small population that
surrounded the test site that there was more to the impact
of radioactive fallout than previously considered.
Vehicles were washed and so were clothes, but the
hundreds of cattle and horses that were blinded or
suffered strange burns and the thousands of sheep that
died drew national attention to the idea of radiation
exposure and damage through fallout. Coupled with the
deaths of over a dozen children, who lived in
communities surrounding the test site of leukemia
between 1956 and 1961, and the strange burns and other
injuries adults in the same area suffered, in hindsight to
many community members these damages occurring a the
same time as atmospheric testing seemed suspiciously
connected.

1. Introduction
On May 19, 1953 the Atomic Energy Commission’s
atomic test designated Harry detonated before dawn on
the Nevada Proving Ground, producing a cloud of
radioactive material which began to disburse over the
region’s major highways and small towns east of the test
site’s boundary. Several hundred vehicles were stopped
on highways 91 and 93 and motorists were warned to roll
up their windows and keep their air intakes sealed. Men
in white coats with Geiger counters told the public that
there was “no danger” but to stay inside their vehicle until
they were out of the path of the radioactive cloud. Many
of these vehicles were sent for decontamination in St.
George or Las Vegas to free car washes funded by the
AEC. In addition, the agency’s meteorologists had noted
just after dawn that the radioactive cloud was headed into
some thunderheads over St. George and issued a warning
to residents to stay indoors from nine in the morning until
noon to avoid any potential fallout. An AEC
spokesperson issued a statement to the media in which he
insisted that despite these precautionary measures,
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Figure 1. Harry shot May 19, 1953.

2. Delineating Safety during the Cold War
From 1951 to 1992, the AEC, and its later incarnation
the Department of Energy (DOE), conducted this
country’s atomic testing program. Situated in southern
Nevada, approximately seventy miles north of Las Vegas,
what became known as the Nevada Test Site hosted
roughly half of all of the nation’s atmospheric tests and
nearly all of its underground tests. This stark and

beautiful landscape essentially functioned as a scientific
proving ground and an outdoor laboratory, yet unlike
indoor testing facilities, the effects of atomic tests were
not confined to the boundaries of the test site.
Communities surrounding the NTS, though told testing
was “safe,” were negatively affected by the products of
the testing program, especially atmospheric disbursement
of radioactive fallout. [2]
The AEC, concerned about maintaining a continental
testing facility and aware that atomic testing would
impact communities such as St. George in Utah and
Caliente, Hiko, and Ely in Nevada, sent representatives to
areas potentially affected by fallout to educate and inform
the public. These radiation monitors were the public
liaisons between the atomic testing program and the
offsite communities. What they said in their official
capacity as testing representatives with reference to the
issue of “safety” was often interpreted by offsite
communities to mean “no impact,” although what the
term as used by these officials indicated was “no
permanent
damage.”
The
two
impacts
this
miscommunication had on community members’
perception of atomic testing and the government were: (1)
how different individuals in the offsite communities
around the NTS understood the term “safety” often
determined their responses to fallout exposure and to the
expert officials sent to disseminate safety information and
(2) the informal relationship built between some monitors
and the offsite communities they served had great bearing
on the AEC’s success in eventually communicating the
“safety” of atomic testing.
In the early years of continental testing, 1951-1970,
the AEC contracted with the Army and then the Public
Health Service (PHS) to monitor offsite radiation—that
which occurred beyond the boundaries of the Nellis
Gunnery and Bombing Range—and inform the small
rural communities surrounding the NTS of the proper
precautions needed to avoid protracted and dangerous
exposure to radioactive fallout. Although not mandated
by the federal government, this early offsite monitoring
program was part of the AEC’s efforts to ensure the
safety of the public and secure the relatively new and
somewhat controversial continental testing site in
Nevada. Any community within a two hundred mile
radius might be in the path of significant radioactive
fallout, but the AEC’s investigative committee which set
up the NTS had determined that the “size of the risk” of a
continental test site was that a small population would
receive some exposure. According to the prevailing
scientific theory on radiation exposure, a zero level was
not necessary to prevent harm to health. As long as the
exposure was less than the theoretically determined safe
level, there would be no permanent harm done. [3]
The collective goal of the AEC and PHS was to
assure the “greatest health benefit of atomic energy and

its by-products to the general public and at the same time
the greatest protection to the public health.” Radiation
monitoring was not only a priority for the nation’s safety,
but a necessary tool in ensuring that Americans cooperate
with the establishment and maintenance of a continental
test site. Unfortunately, conditions in American society in
the early 1950s were especially prohibitive to disclosing
sensitive information to the public: the Soviet Union’s
detonation of a hydrogen bomb in 1949, the trial and
execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg for treason in
1951, and the general paranoia produced by the McCarthy
hearings and the Korean War inhibited the necessary flow
of information from scientific experts to the communities
surrounding the test site. Rather than educate and inform
the public about what was known of the hazards of
fallout, radiation monitors sent into offsite communities
were more often military personnel who instead
instructed and reassured the public. After taking Geiger
counter readings, they merely told people there was no
danger and advised them on decontamination procedures.
[4]

3. Differing Interpretations of Safety
When the AEC made its fourteenth annual report to
Congress in 1953 about the year’s events, there was no
general indication that the fallout had done any harm.
What did not appear in the government’s report were
accounts of thousands of sheep deaths in southwestern
Utah. About five thousand sheep grazing on the NevadaUtah border directly east of the test site suffered burns,
blindness, and death—a 30% loss of lambs and a 20%
loss of mature sheep—during the same period as the 1953
test series. The AEC had been asked to look into the
sheep deaths, but their investigation culminated in a
report in August of 1953 without making any correlation
between fallout exposure and sheep injury. The two
investigating veterinarians, Navy Major Robert Veenstra
of the US Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory and the
AEC’s investigator on the Trinity test from Los Alamos,
Dr. Robert Tompsett, determined that there was no direct
evidence that radiation precipitated the sheep losses. The
causes of the reported burns and the sheep deaths were
determined to be coincidental with the test series and the
sheep were said to suffer from malnutrition as their
grazing areas were particularly lean in the drought of that
year. However, buried within the report was the opinion
of the veterinarians Veenstra and Thompsett that there
was a “surprisingly high concentration of radioactive
elements which had become fixed in the thyroid tissue
and bones” of the dead sheep. [5]
The impact the sheep deaths had on the AEC’s public
relations with the communities surrounding the test site
was profound. Although radiation monitors had been sent
to towns such as St. George, Ely, Caliente, and Hiko, very

little thought had been given to reaching ranchers who
lived and ran their livestock in the vast spaces in between.
The AEC treated the sheep men during the investigation
as uneducated non-experts which deeply undercut the
trust this small group of people had with their
government. The report depicted the sheep men as
“mostly uneducated and untrained … not capable of
detecting trouble until the actual deaths of the animals,”
and that as a result, no “professional” treatment had been
given to the affected animals before their deaths
prohibiting an exhaustive investigation. [6]
Ranchers from Tonopah to Ely to St. George found it
difficult to believe that the sheep died from malnutrition.
They found it completely incongruent for the AEC to tell
them the testing was safe and there was no danger from
fallout when five thousand sheep carcasses exhibited
symptoms none of them had ever seen before: mouths
that bled and then scarred white, wool that pulled out and
left bald patches, burns that never healed, eyes that went
blind, and babies born with pot bellies and stubby legs.
Their conversations with the investigative veterinarians
left them with the impression that their sheep had indeed
been exposed to significant amounts of radiation and that
their hunch had been correct. In light of the 1954 Castle
series held in the Pacific in which a Japanese fishing boat,
the Fortunate Dragon [Fukuru Maru], was heavily
irradiated causing the deaths of crew members which
made national news, it became even more plausible that
their sheep had died from radiation exposure. The
ranchers hired Dan Bushnell, a local attorney in St.
George, to take the case to court, but no resolution was
reached for decades, despite the efforts of former
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall. The AEC’s
response throughout the rest of the 1950s was that other
official reports refuted and therefore invalidated the initial
findings of the two veterinarians. [7]
For the ranchers nearest the test site, the Uhaldes at
Adaven, the Sharps at Blue Eagle, the Fallinis at Twin
Springs, and others, the AEC’s standard reassurances of
safety became harder and harder to believe. Although
reporter Gladwin Hill from the New York Times
interviewed several community members in 1957 who
were relatively unconcerned about the atomic testing
program and thought much of the “scare talk” was just
people wanting public attention, most in offsite
communities felt differently. The Los Angeles Times also
interviewed ranchers and farmers around the NTS who
claimed that atomic testing was a threat to their families
and livestock. In the face of what the ranchers themselves
witnessed, they did not believe the AEC’s claim that
testing had not caused serious illness or injury to the
health of livestock or residents: a rancher’s son, Martin
Bordoli had died of leukemia, Father Ryan, a priest from
Caliente fell ill after driving near the test site’s northern

sector, and local highway employee Bert Wilson had
suffered since 1955 from burns that would not heal. [8]
These incidents with families, and especially children,
as well as the damage to cattle, sheep, horses, and dogs
from burns, cancer and blindness made ranchers want the
testing stopped. Many wondered why tests were
postponed if the fallout cloud might head south over Las
Vegas, but not over them. Helen Fallini, who suffered
from eye trouble she attributed to radiation exposure,
wondered “Why is fallout harmful if it goes over Las
Vegas and not harmful if it comes over here?” Her fatherin-law Eugene speculated that “If fallout isn’t harmful …
let it go wherever it wants to go.” Damage to the animals
and the community made it difficult for people living in
the areas surrounding the test site to “believe the
assurances of the AEC that tests do not pose a threat to
their health.” But the AEC continued its program of
reassuring and instructing instead of educating and
informing the public. [9]

4. Different Meanings of Expertise
One of the most prolific forms of reassurance was the
official guide monitors disseminated to offsite
communities to inform them about safety measures. Many
ranchers found it extremely patronizing. [Figure 2] The
document singled out offsite communities by saying
“You people who live near the Nevada Test Site are in a
very real sense active participants in the Nation’s atomic
test program.” The booklet congratulated them that
although some had “been inconvenienced by our [AEC]
test operations,” offsite communities nevertheless had
“accepted them without fuss and without alarm.” It
reassured them that “To our knowledge no one outside
the test site has been hurt in six years of testing.” Offsite
residents were told that a panel of experts in “biology and
medicine, blast, fallout, and meteorology,” determined
when testing took place. [10]
The guide provided simplified technical and scientific
explanations of the products of atomic explosions as if the
process was fully understood and containable. It did not,
however, exclude the possibility of harm, just the
probability. “Simply stated,” the booklet read, “findings
have confirmed that Nevada test fallout has not caused
illness or injured the health of anyone living near the test
site [but] … Because fallout consists of small particles, it
cannot be guaranteed that a small beta burn would never
occur to a person living near the test site.” The work also
reassured communities that “Test officials would not
approve a shot if they knew that resulting fallout on any
community would be heavy.” Communities were told that
“If you are in an area exposed to fallout, you will be so
advised by … radiation monitors who will explain just
what is happening.” Gracian Uhalde remembers the little

black book the AEC handed out to inform the public—to
him it was nothing more than a little cartoon book. [11]

anything. You know of course, the DOE [said] you don’t
say this, you don’t say that, or anything. When we were
asked, we’d tell them … that’s what they liked … they
didn’t appreciate people, the Army, because they
wouldn’t say anything, and then when they did answer
the people, they’d lie to them, and that just doesn’t work.”
[13]

5. Conclusion

Figure 2. Drawings from Atomic Tests in Nevada.
Early radiation monitors were not able to
communicate their reassurances effectively and ranchers
had a difficult time accepting this information and
cooperating with monitors’ requests. Not only did it seem
that their version of events and definition of safety
differed greatly from the AEC’s, but their perception of
expertise did as well. Lina Sharp, relative of Minnie,
thought the early field men were snotty, young kids that
looked down on ranchers who worked in near isolation in
the Great Basin. She said “We didn’t want to cooperate
with them because we didn’t like their attitudes and we
weren’t going to do anything with them.” Rather than
viewing the radiation monitors as experts, Lina thought
that the ranchers were “as good or better than they were
… they were just young kids who were not very smart,
intelligent, or anything.” Until the death of her nephew,
the AEC had not placed any monitoring equipment
anywhere near Helen Fallini’s ranch or any of the others.
Because “they kept saying it wasn’t hurting us.” It was
“just the fact,” she said, “that when we started squawking
about letting so much of that fallout come up over us this
way.” [12]
But some monitors were better than others in the eyes
of the offsite communities; Public Health Service monitor
Don James is remembered well. It seemed everybody
particularly liked Don James because, as he describes, he
did not have all the answers and said so. Don seemed like
a real human being to the ranchers, always happy-golucky. Gracian Uhalde said he was “just there to basically
have a good time and do whatever he could do.” Don had
grown up in Erie, Colorado on a farm and worked at
Rocky Flats producing detonators until 1961 when he
moved to Las Vegas to work as a monitor at the test site.
He developed relationships with the Fallinis, Sharps,
Uhaldes, and many other ranching families north of the
test site. Don said that “you can’t fool those people
[ranchers], they’re pretty smart you know.” “We’d tell
them everything,” he said, “we never held back on

For the ranching communities outside the test site, the
most important message they heard from the AEC was
that atomic testing was safe. They understood the concept
to mean that there would be no visible impact or damage.
Burns on livestock and especially on people and children
dying of leukemia did not speak to the safety of atomic
testing and radioactive fallout. Scientists on the other
hand understood safety to mean that there would be no
significant or permanent damage. Testing officials knew
there would be effects of atomic testing in Nevada,
especially in offsite communities. Although they did not
blatantly deceive people about the effects, they certainly
minimized their impact to the extent that when offsite
communities were finally given the necessary information
about he risks of atomic testing, community members felt
they were lied to by the very government that was trying
to protect them.
Historian Barton Hacker writes that the AEC’s
decision to reassure this population that there was no
danger and that atomic testing was safe, as opposed to
inform them of the effects of radiation exposure, only
served to make offsite communities suspicious and
unhappy. “Assuming the public could not grasp” the
differences between “minor versus major risk, the AEC
preferred to claim no risk at all.” Yet it would be a
mistake to think that the AEC simply did not care about
the impact of fallout on offsite communities. Richard
Miller explains that the agency was consistently torn
between guarding and divulging information to the public
that could either harm or support their mission. According
to Paul Boyer, despite “a disinformation campaign by
federal officials pooh-pooing the health hazards of
radioactivity,” concerned scientists and the public at large
“became deeply alarmed.” Geneticists, he writes, claimed
that “the concept of a safe rate of radiation simply does
not make sense,” that “there is no such thing as a safe
dose of radiation to the population.” But Dr. Shields
Warren of the AEC summed up the situation, writing that
from the AEC’s perspective, genetic risk from radioactive
fallout was “so slight in relation to other risks as to be
disregarded.” [14]
Some of those other risks included the perception of
damage by the public, whether actual or not, the threat of
closure of the Nevada Test Site, and America’s loss in the
arms race. It was easier for the AEC to not to explain the

intricacies of radiation exposure when the subject was
heavily contested within the scientific community and
could ultimate lead to loosing the Cold War. By the end
of atmospheric testing, public opinion surrounding the
test site was persistently negative. And yet, the informal
relationships radiation monitors like Don James
developed with the Uhaldes, Fallinis, Sharps and other
ranching families served to reestablish a basis of trust
previously lost between the government and the offsite
communities. Through these informal relationships,
information and mutual respect were exchanged and very
few of the communities surrounding the test site, in the
end, did not support their government.
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